Abstract: A distributed key generation (DKG) protocol is a central component in distributed cryptosystems. It allows a group of participants to jointly generate a pair of keys (private key and public key) without assuming any trusted participant. The public key is output in clear but only authorised subgroups of participants are able to reconstruct or use the private key. Existing literature on DKG protocols assumes equal authority for participants. In this study, the authors consider the problem of DKG in groups with hierarchical structure where the authorised subsets can be defined by a hierarchical threshold access structure. They first propose a verifiable hierarchical threshold secret sharing protocol. On the basis of this construction, they then propose a new DKG protocol with hierarchical threshold access structure for discrete-logarithm-based cryptosystems. It is shown that the proposed protocols satisfy all the security requirements.
Introduction
Distributed cryptosystems rely heavily on distributed key generation (DKG) protocols. In DKG protocols, a group of participants cooperate to jointly generate a pair of private/public keys according to the distribution defined by the underlying cryptosystem, without assuming any trusted party (dealer). This is done without ever having to compute, reconstruct or store the secret key in any single location. In such protocols, the public key is output in clear and the private key is maintained as virtual secret shared via a secret sharing scheme [1] . This shared private key can be later used by a distributed cryptosystem, for example, to compute distributed signatures or perform distributed decryptions.
In [2] , Pedersen employed Feldman's verifiable threshold secret sharing (VTSS) protocol [3] to propose the first DKG protocol which is a (t, n)-threshold DKG (TDKG). In a (t, n)-TDKG protocol, subsets of participants who are able to use the secret in a distributed manner are those with at least t members. In [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , various modifications of Pedersen's (t, n)-TDKG protocol are proposed for threshold cryptography. In 2007, Gennaro et al. [1] showed that Pedersen's protocol, and therefore all its modifications, do not guarantee uniform distribution of the generated public key and proposed a new (t, n)-TDKG protocol based on Pedersen's VTSS protocol [10] . Compared with Pedersen's protocol, Gennaro et al.'s protocol is more secure but needs more communication and computational power. In [1] , Gennaro et al. also specified the situations in which each of these two protocols are utilisable according to the trade-off between security and performance that arises when comparing them. References [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] are some recent publications that used Gennaro et al.'s DKG protocol (with possibly some modifications) to build threshold cryptosystems. The above-mentioned DKG protocols are applicable in (partially) synchronous networks. In [16] , Kate and Goldberg proposed the only existing DKG protocol applicable in asynchronous networks. In this paper, we are only concerned with DKG for discrete-logarithm-based cryptosystems. However, there is a vast of research papers on DKG protocols for factoring-based cryptosystems. For more information, the interested readers are able to see [17] [18] [19] [20] .
So far, the problem of DKG has only been considered with the assumption of equal authority for all of the participants. However, the assumption is not always true and in some situations participants have different levels of authority. For example, consider the management of a corporation in which there are ten managers divided into three different levels of authority. Suppose that there are three managers in the highest level, three managers in the second level and four managers in the last level. On the basis of the existing hierarchical structure in this example, it is not realistic to use an ordinary threshold signature scheme and give all managers the same authority in signing the documents of the corporation. Moreover, at least for two reasons, it is not wise to give the signing power to the small group containing high ranked managers: (i) because by decreasing the number of managers, the probability of successful point of failure and misuse increases and (ii) although the managers in lower levels have less authorities but they have the right to participate in corporation activities. As a better solution, assume that a signature σ has been issued by the corporation with the condition that σ is valid if at least two managers from the first level, at least four managers from either the first level or the second one and at least seven managers from all the corporation's managers have cooperated jointly in generating σ. It is obvious that existing (t, n)-TDKG protocols are not able to handle situations like this.
To take the differences of participants' authorities into account, in this paper, we consider the problem of DKG when the set of participants U = P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n is partitioned into m disjoint subsets U 1 , . . . , U m and while all the participants in the same subset are considered equal in terms of their authority level, the ones from different subsets have predefined differences in this regard. In this case, the authorised subsets of participants can be defined by a hierarchical threshold access structure (HTAS). To the best of our knowledge, so far, two types of HTAS considered in the literature, that is, 'disjunctive HTAS [21] [22] [23] [24] and conjunctive HTAS [24] [25] [26] [27] '. In HTASs, the authorised subsets are defined by a strictly increasing sequence of threshold parameters t 0 , t 1 , · · · , t m . In conjunctive HTASs, a subset A of players is authorised if it satisfies all of the threshold requirements, that is, A > i j=0 U j ≥ t i , for i = 0, …, m. In disjunctive HTASs, the satisfaction of one of the threshold requirements makes a subset A of participants authorised. This paper is concerned about conjunctive HTASs (referred to as HTAS throughout this paper). We propose a hierarchical TDKG (HTDKG) protocol based on Gennaro et al. ' propose a verifiable HTSS (VHTSS) protocol. The proposed VHTSS protocol is based on Pedersen's VTSS protocol [10] and Tassa's HTSS scheme. Then, a HTDKG protocol is proposed in which the proposed VHTSS protocol has been used implicitly. On the basis of intractability of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), the proof of correctness and security of both protocols are also provided. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the preliminaries needed in this paper. In Section 3, after reviewing the formal definition of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocols, a VHTSS protocol is proposed. In Section 4, the formal definition of DKG protocols and their security requirements are provided first, and then a new DKG protocol with HTAS is proposed. The security and performance analysis of the proposed DKG protocol is provided in the last part of this section. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, preliminaries needed in this paper including the Birkhoff interpolation procedure, complexity assumption, communication model and adversarial model are described.
Birkhoff interpolation
In this section, we briefly review the basic terminology and results of the theory of Birkhoff interpolation.
Definition 1: Let X, E and C be defined as follows: † X = {x 1 , …, x k } is a given set of points in the set of real numbers (R), where
is a matrix with binary entries, I(E) = {(i, j)}: e i, j and N = |I(E)| (we assume hereafter that the right-most column in E is non-zero); and † C = {c i, j :(i, j) ∈ I(E)} is a set of N real values.
Then the Birkhoff interpolation problem that corresponds to the triplet 〈X, E, C〉 is the problem of finding a polynomial P(x) ∈ R N−1 [x] that satisfies the N equalities
where P ( j ) (·) is the ( j)th derivative of P(x) and R N−1 [x] is the set of all possible polynomials with degree at most N − 1. The matrix E is called the interpolation matrix [24] .
Unlike Lagrange and Hermite interpolation problems, that are unconditionally well posed, the Birkhoff interpolation problem may not admit a unique solution. The sufficient conditions for Birkhoff interpolation problem to be well posed over finite fields are given in [24] . In the following, we provide the details of the Birkhoff interpolation.
Let j = {g 0 , g 1 , …, g N−1 } be a system of linearly independent, N − 1 times continuously differentiable real-valued functions and I′(E) = {α i :i = 1, …, N} be a vector that obtained by lexicographically ordering of entries of I(E) (in I′(E) the pair (i, k) precedes (i′, k′) if and only if i < i′ or i = i′ and k < k′). Let α i (1) and α i (2) denote the first and second elements of the pair α i ∈ I′(E). Moreover, consider C ′ = {c ′ i :i = 1, . . . , N } as another vector that obtained by lexicographically ordering of entries of C (the ordering procedure is done based on indexes of elements in C ). Now, by using the elements E, X and j we are able to solve a Birkhoff interpolation problem as follows
where
|·| is the determinant operation and A(E, X, j j ) can be computed by replacing ( j + 1)th column of matrix (3) with C′. By reformulating (2) (i.e. by expanding |A(E, X, j j )| down to its ( j + 1)th column), we have the following equation for Birkhoff interpolating procedure (1)
where A i (E, X, j j ) can be computed from A(E, X, j j ) by removing its (i + 1)th row and ( j + 1)th column. From (4), it is obvious that
In particular, let j = {g 0 (x) = 1,
}, then g 0 (0) = 1 and g j (0) = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. Therefore we can compute P(0) as follows
In the following, we define the Birkhoff interpolation coefficients which would be needed in the security proof of our protocols.
Definition 2: Birkhoff interpolation coefficients: Same as for the Lagrange interpolation problem, if an instance of Birkhoff interpolation problem is well posed then, we have c
The entries of
would be called Birkhoff interpolation coefficients corresponding to the set X and the interpolation matrix E.
Complexity assumptions
DLP: Given a multiplicative group G = <g> with the prime order q and h ∈ G, the DLP is to find a ∈ Z q such that h = g a . The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving an instance of DLP is defined as
The DLP assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, Adv DLP A is negligible.
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Communication model
We assume that the communication model is composed of a set of n participants P 1 , …, P n that can be modelled by polynomial-time randomised Turing machines. There is a dedicated broadcast channel through which participants can broadcast messages to all other participants. Moreover, each participant has access to a private channel with any other one in the communication model. As in [1] , we consider a partially synchronous communication model, that is, computation proceeds in synchronised rounds and messages are received by their recipients within some specified time bound. To guarantee this round synchronisation, and for simplicity of discussion, we assume that the participants are equipped with synchronised clocks. In this way, we would be sure that the sent messages are received by their recipients within some specified time bound. In this model, in each round, the adversary can wait to receive the messages from uncorrupted participants and then decide on the computations and communications on behalf of corrupted participants for this round. Note that the communication modelled here is more realistic than the fully synchronous model in which messages of all the participants at each round of the protocol are sent and delivered to their intended recipients simultaneously.
Adversarial model
We prove the security of the proposed protocols against polynomial-time adversaries who are able to corrupt at most a subset of participants (denoted by CP) satisfying the following conditions: † CP does not contain any authorised subset of participants, that is,
, where U is the set of participants which is partitioned into authority levels U 0 , . . . , U m and t i s are the required threshold parameters.
We only consider the security of the proposed protocols against the static adversaries; that is, the adversaries choose the corrupted participants at the beginning of the protocols. However, the adversaries can corrupt participants to divert from the specified protocol in any way.
Proposed VSS protocol with HTAS
In this section, a VHTSS protocol is proposed which will be used implicitly in the next section to propose a HTDKG protocol. In the following, the definition and security requirements of a VSS protocol is reviewed. Then, the details of the proposed VHTSS protocol are provided.
Definitions
Let U = {P 1 , . . . , P n } be the set of participants and D be the dealer. Then, a VSS protocol is a pair (sharing-verify, reconstruction) of phases as follows.
Sharing-verify: In this phase, on input the secret s, D generates the share corresponding to each participant P i [ U and sends it through a secure channel to P i . The dealer also generates some public information to verify the validity of shares. At the end of this phase, each participant P i [ U is instructed to output a value verification i ∈ {accept, reject}.
Reconstruction: The input of this phase is the shares corresponding to a subset of participants. At first, the validity of each share is verified by other participants. Then, if the set of participants with valid shares is an authorised set, the secret can be computed by applying a reconstruction function on the provided shares.
A VSS protocol is called secure if it satisfies the following properties:
(1) Acceptance: If an honest participant outputs 'reject', then all honest participants also output 'reject' at the end of sharing-verify phase. Moreover, if the dealer is not corrupted by the adversary, then all honest participants output 'accept'. (2) Verifiability/reconstructability: All subsets of participants containing one authorised subset of participants with valid shares recover the same unique secret σ. With the assumption of honesty of the dealer, we should have σ = s, where s is the original shared secret. (3) Privacy: If the dealer is not corrupt, then no unauthorised subset of participants is able to obtain any information about the secret.
Proposed protocol
The proposed VHTSS protocol is based on Tassa's scheme [24] and Pedersen's protocol [10] . The details of the proposed protocol are as follows.
Let U = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } be a set of n participants which is partitioned into m + 1 levels U 0 , U 1 , . . . , U m . Suppose that the participants in U 0 are P 1 , . . . , P |U 0 | , the participants in U 1 are P |U 0 |+1 , . . . , P |U 0 |+|U 1 | and so on, where |U i | denotes the size of the ith level for i = 0, …, m. Assume that the sequence of threshold requirements t 0 , t 1 , · · · , t m (=t) determines the HTAS. Let p and q be two large primes such that q|( p − 1) and G = 〈g〉 be a subgroup of elements of order q in Z * p . To ensure well posedness of the interpolation problem needed in the reconstruction phase of the proposed protocol, the prime q also has to satisfy q > 2 −t + 2 ·(t − 1) (t−1)/2 ·(t − 1)!·n (t−1)(t−2)/2 . Let h be an element of G such that its relative discrete logarithm with g is unknown to any entity in the system.
The proposed VHTSS protocol consists of the following phases. Sharing-verify: To share the secret s ∈ Z q among participants P 1 , …, P n , (1) The dealer (D): † Constructs polynomials f 1 (·) and f 2 (·) as follows
where a 0 = s and a 1 , …,
where k is such that P j [ U k and f
is the (t k−1 )th derivative of f b (x) for b ∈ {0, 1}. † Sends (sh j , sh ′ j ) to P j for j = 1, …, n via a secure channel.
(2) To verify the validity of his shares, each P j [ U verifies the following relation
where g ) to recover the secret. At first, the validity of the shares is checked by (7) . Then, if all of the shares are valid, the polynomials f 1 (·) and f 2 (·) can be reconstructed by employing Birkhoff interpolation on pairs a i , sh a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t and a i , sh
, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, respectively. The secret can be retrieved as the constant term of f 1 (·).
Security analysis
In this section, we show that the proposed VHTSS protocol satisfies all properties needed by a secure VSS protocol under the intractability of DLP. We prove this through the following theorems:
Theorem 1: The proposed VHTSS protocol provides the acceptance property.
Theorem 2:
The proposed protocol has the verifiability/ reconstructability property.
Theorem 3:
The proposed VHTSS protocol has the privacy property.
The proofs of these theorems are provided in Appendix.
HTDKG protocols
As explained in Section 1, the existing TDKG protocols are not applicable in situations where the participants have different levels of authority. To solve this problem, in this section, we employ the VHTSS protocol of the previous section to propose a DKG protocol with HTAS (HTDKG). We first review the definition and security requirements of a DKG protocol, and then provide the details of our proposed DKG protocol. The security and performance analysis of the proposed protocol are provided in the last parts of this section.
Definitions
Let U = {P 1 , . . . , P n } be the set of participants and p and q be two large primes such that q|( p − 1). A DKG protocol is a pair (secret-key generation and public-key extraction) of phases as follows. Secret-key generation: In this phase, each participant (as a dealer) distributes a random value among the set of participants (including himself) via a VSS scheme. At the end of this phase, a secret x (mod q) is distributed among the set of participants and each participant has access to his share from it.
Public-key extraction: In this phase, the set of participants cooperate to generate the public key corresponding to the secret key generated in the previous phase (x); that is, g x (mod p). A DKG protocol is called secure if the following requirements for correctness and secrecy are satisfied: † Correctness (C1) The set of shares corresponding to every subset of participants, containing one authorised subset of participants with valid shares define the same unique secret key x.
(C2) All honest participants have the same value of public key y = g x (mod p), where x is the unique secret guaranteed by (C1). (C3) x is uniformly distributed in Z q (and hence y is uniformly distributed in the subgroup generated by g). † Secrecy: Except for what is implied by the value y = g x (mod p), no information on x can be learned by an adversary who is not able to corrupt all of the participants in an authorised subset.
Proposed HTDKG protocol
In this section, we use the same notations as in Section 3. The proposed DKG protocol consists of the following phases. 
Secret-key generation
. Denotes a i0 by x i .
(1-1-3) Computes the shares corresponding to each participant P j [ U as
where k is such that P j [ U k .
(1-1-4) Sends the shares of each participant through a secure channel.
(1-2) To verify the validity of the received shares, each participant P j [ U verifies his shares through the following relation for i = 1, …, n ( ≠ j)
where k is such that P j [ U k and g
is the value of (t k−1 )th derivative of g l (x) = x l at point x = j. If the check fails for an index i, P j broadcasts a complaint against P i .
(1-3) On receiving a complaint from participant P j , P i broadcasts the values sh i j , sh ′ i j that satisfy (8) .
(1-4) P j marks P i as disqualified if: † The set of participants who have broadcasted a complaint against P i in step (1-2) create an authorised subset or † P i 's broadcasted values in answer to a complaint (in step (1-3) ) do not satisfy (8) .
(1-5) Each participant builds the set of non-disqualified participants QUAL. (Note that since the disqualified participants are determined based on broadcasted values, all participants define the same set QUAL.) (1-6) Each participant P i sets his total shares as sh i = j[QUAL sh j i ( mod q) and sh
The distributed secret value is x = i[QUAL x i (mod q).
Public-key extraction:
(2-1) Each participant P i (i ∈ QUAL):
l=0 . (2-1-2) For all other participants P j ( j ∈ QUAL) verifies the broadcasted values through
where g
is the value of (t k−1 )th derivative of g l (x) = x l at point x = i and k is such that P i [ U k . (2-1-3 ) If the verification fails, broadcasts sh j i , sh j i that satisfy (8) but do not satisfy (9) as a complaint against P j .
(2-2) For participants P i who receive at least one valid complaint, that is, values which satisfy (8) and not (9) , the other participants run the reconstruction phase of the proposed VHTSS protocol to compute f i (x) and {A ik } In Section 2.1, we obtained a simple equation to compute the constant term of a polynomial in a Birkhoff interpolation problem (i.e. (6)). On the basis of the similarity of this equation and that of Lagrange interpolation for computing the constant term of a polynomial, it is easy to see that the proposed protocol can be used instead of Gennaro et al.'s DKG protocol to generate hierarchical threshold cryptosystems.
Security analysis
In this section, we show that the proposed HTDKG protocol satisfies all the correctness and security requirements under DLP assumption.
Correctness:
Theorem 4: The proposed HTDKG protocol satisfies (C1) requirement; that is, in the proposed protocol, the shares corresponding to all authorised subsets of participants define the same unique secret key x.
Proof: If j ∈ QUAL, then P j as a dealer has successfully shared the secret x j through the proposed VHTSS protocol (presented in Section 3). Now, let AutSub = P a 1 , P a 2 , . . . , P a t be any arbitrary authorised subset of participants with corresponding shares sh a 1 , sh a 2 , . . . , sh a t (with α i < α j for i < j). The participants in AutSub can use their shares and define the secret x through
where the last equality follows from Theorem 2 which implies that the shares corresponding to any authorised subset of participants from the secret x j define the same unique secret (x j ). □ Theorem 5: The proposed HTDKG protocol satisfies (C2); that is, in the proposed HTDKG protocol, all non-disqualified participants compute the same value of public key y = g x (mod p), where x is the unique secret guaranteed by Theorem 4.
Proof: The value of y is computed as y = i[QUAL y i , where y i s are public values. Therefore all participants compute the same value y. We show that for each i ∈ QUAL, y i is equal to g x i , and therefore
For each participant P i (i ∈ QUAL) against whom a valid complaint has been issued in step (2-1-3), the value x i is publicly reconstructed and the value y i is set to g x i (mod p) (the correct reconstruction of x i is guaranteed by Theorem 2). For each other participant P i (i ∈ QUAL) against whom a valid complaint has not been issued, the value y i is set to A i,0 . Values A ik , k = 0, …, t, broadcasted by P i in step (2-1-1) define a (t − 1)-degree polynomialf i (x) in Z q . Since we assume that no valid complaint was issued against P i , then (9) is satisfied for all honest participants. Since we assumed that there is at least one authorised subset Autsub , QUAL, thenf i (x) and f i (x) are equal, and in particular
The proposed HTDKG protocol satisfies (C3); that is, the secret key x is uniformly distributed in Z q , and therefore y is uniformly distributed in the subgroup of Z p generated by g. The proof of this theorem is same as that in Gennaro et al.'s [1] paper. We refer the interested reader to [1] .
Security:
The following theorem shows that the proposed HTDKG protocol is provable secure. Proof: To prove the security of the proposed DKG protocol, a simulator S is provided which acts against the adversary A (described in Section 2.4) to solve an instance of DLP problem. It is shown that on input a DLP (g, y), S can act in such a way that the public key of the group of participants (U) become y. Hence, the answer to the DLP would be the secret key of the group. In the following, we assume that: † The compromised participants are B = P b 1 , . . . , P b l and the uncorrupted participants are
is not an authorised subset even in the case l ≥ t). † B is only missing one participant to become authorised (i.e. the worst case is considered). † B′ is a subset of B such that |B′| = t − 1 and B′ ∪ {P 0 } is an authorised subset, where P 0 could be any participant from U 0 . † The participants in B′ are P b 1 , . . . , P b t−1 . † The corrupted participants are controlled by A and the uncorrupted participants are controlled by S. □
Algorithm of simulator S:
Input: public key y.
(1) Perform the 'secret-key generation' phase of the proposed HTDKG protocol on behalf of uncorrupted participants exactly as in the proposed protocol. This includes receiving and processing the information sent privately and publicly from corrupted participants to honest ones. At the end of step (1-5) the following hold: † The set QUAL is fixed. Note that G⊆QUAL and that polynomials f i (z), f ′ i (z) for P i ∈ G are chosen at random. † A's view consists of polynomials f i (z), f ′ i (z) for P i ∈ B, the shares (sh j i , sh
is such that P i [ U k and all the public values C jl for P j ∈ G, l = 0, …, t − 1. † S knows all polynomials f i (z), f ′ i (z) for i ∈ QUAL (note that for i ∈ QUAL ∩ B the honest participants, and hence S receive enough consistent shares from A that allow S to compute all these participants' polynomials). In particular, S knows all the shares sh i j , sh ′ i j , the coefficients a il , b il and the public values C il .
(2) Perform the following computations:
l li , where l li s are appropriate Birkhoff interpolation coefficients (see Definition 2). † Broadcast A il for i ∈ G/{β n } and A * b n l for l = 0, …, t − 1. † For each participant P i ∈ B, verify the broadcasted values A ik through (9) and broadcast a complaint against P i if the verification does not hold. (Note that the corrupted participants cannot complain against uncorrupted participants.) † Perform step (2-2) of the protocol on behalf of the uncorrupted participants to compute x i and y i in the clear for every P i against whom a valid complaint was broadcast in the previous step.
Performance analysis
In this section, we compare the proposed DKG protocol with the existing DKG protocols. To the best of our knowledge, there exist two main DKG protocols in the literature, that is, Pedersen's (t, n)-TDKG [2] (denoted by TDKG P ) and Gennaro et al.'s [1] (t, n)-TDKG (denoted by TDKG G ) and other DKG protocols are modifications of one of the two. Therefore we compare the proposed approach with TDKG P and TDKG G . The comparison is done in terms of computational complexity, communication complexity, the achieved security and the access structure that each of these protocols supports. The results are summarised in Table 1 with the following notations: n is the total number of participants, t is the size of each authorised subset of participants, TAS is the threshold access structure and HTAS is the hierarchical TAS.
In terms of computational complexity, the required number of exponentiation operations that is needed to be done by each participant in the proposed protocol is the same as that in TDKG G . Compared with TDKG G , in the proposed DKG, each participant needs to compute the derivatives of some polynomials in steps (1-1-3), (1-2) and (2-1-2) of the proposed protocol. Therefore the number of multiplication operations in the proposed protocol exceeds that of TDKG G (but is still in the same order of complexity). Since exponentiation is the most time-consuming operation used in DKG protocols, we conclude that the efficiency of the proposed protocol is almost the same as that of TDKG G . The required number of multiplication and exponentiation operations in TDKG P is about half of that in TDKG G and our DKG. Therefore TDKG P is more efficient than TDKG G and ours. In Table 1 , the required number of exponentiation operations that is needed to be done by each participant in each of the protocols is reported.
In terms of communication complexity, the proposed DKG, such as TDKG G , requires two communication rounds while TDKG P needs one communication round. Therefore TDKG P is more efficient than the proposed DKG and TDKG G .
Note that in the above discussion, it is implicitly assumed that computations are done in the absence of faults, that is, it is assumed that no complaint is issued during the execution of the protocols.
In terms of the achieved security, as shown in Section 4.3, the proposed protocol satisfies all the security and correctness requirements, and therefore is fully secure (such as TDKG G ). On the other hand, TDKG P does not satisfy uniform distribution of the public key (the correctness requirement (C3)), and therefore its applicability is limited.
Finally, the proposed protocol is the only protocol that admits a HTAS, and therefore compared with TDKG P and TDKG G provides better applicability.
Conclusion
In this paper, the problem of generating a distributed key among a group of participants with different levels of authority is considered. As a solution, a new DKG protocol with HTAS is proposed for discrete-logarithm-based cryptosystems. Under the intractability of DLP, the security of the proposed protocol is proved. The proposed protocol can be used in distributed cryptosystems to generate hierarchical threshold signature/ encryption schemes. Proposing DKG protocols with other useful access structures would be an interesting future work. Lemma 3: All subsets of participants containing at least one authorised subset of participants with valid shares recover the same unique secret σ. Moreover, with the assumption of honesty of the dealer, σ = s, where s is the original shared secret.
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Proof: We prove this lemma by showing that if the dealer is able to distribute inconsistent shares without detection, then one can use the inconsistent shares and compute the discrete logarithm of h in base g. Therefore we conclude that all of the shares satisfying (7) are consistent. Suppose that AutSub 1 and AutSub 2 are two authorised subsets of participants such that the shares corresponding to those members are valid but define different secrets. Lemma 2 indicates that participants in AutSub 1 can find the pair of polynomials (F 1 (·), F 2 (·)) with degrees at most t − 1 such that g F 1 (0) h F 2 (0) = C 0 . In the same way, participants in AutSub 2 can find the pair of polynomials (F 
Proof of Theorem 3:
We prove the security of the proposed VSS protocol against adversary A described in Section 2.4. Let B = P b 1 , . . . , P b l be the unauthorised subset of participants that is corrupted by A. Assume that B is missing only one participant in order to become authorised (the worst case is considered, that is, |B| ≥ (t − 1)). We show that in the view of A the secret s could be any value in Z q . Let B ′ = B < {0}, where 0 [ U 0 is a phantom participant. It is easy to see that all authorised subsets of B ′ define two same unique polynomials F 1 (·) and F 2 (·).
Let B″ be an arbitrary authorised subset of B′. Note that 0 has to be a member of B″. Without loss of generality, let B ′′ = 0, P b 1 , . . . , P b t−1 . For every s ∈ Z q , there is exactly one s′ ∈ Z q such that g s h s ′ = C 0 and there are two unique polynomials F 1 (·) and F 2 (·) such that F 1 (0) = s and F 2 (0) = s′,
, where k i is such that
Let F 1 (x) = s + a . . , t − 1, which means that the broadcasted parameters give no information on the secret and completes the proof. □
